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STATEMENT OF CASE
AND FACTS

At age sixteen, petitioner Ethan Windom suffered a psychotic break and killed his
mother. Windom had no prior criminal history. He was charged as an adult with first
degree murder. His public defender negotiated a plea deal wherein Windom pled guilty
to second degree murder with no agreement on sentencing. While incarcerated, Windom
was evaluated by a psychologist and a psychiatrist. Reports by both doctors were
presented at sentencing, concluding that Windom was a paranoid schizophrenic who had
suffered a psychotic break shortly before killing his mother. Both doctors believed that if
Windom had been properly diagnosed and treated, the killing would not have happened.
Both also agreed that Windom would be a good candidate for rehabilitation and
probation. Despite these reports, the court sentenced Windom to life without the
possibility of parole (L WOP) and he appealed. 1
On direct appeal, Windom was represented by appointed counsel from the State
Appellate Public Defender Office. The sole issue raised on appeal was that the sentence
was an abuse of discretion. Over the dissent of Justice Warren Jones who found that the
L WOP sentence violated the Eighth Amendment, the Idaho Supreme Court upheld the

This factual summary is taken from the state Court of Appeal decision in State v.
Windom, Docket No. 34872, 2009 Opinion No, 27; 2009 Ida. App. LEXIS 24; 2009 WL
961232.
1

1

sentence, finding that a fixed-life sentence may be based solely on the nature of the
offense. State v. Windom, 150 Idaho 873,253 P.3d 310,314 (2011).
In a Petition for Rehearing, Windom's counsel argued that the majority opinion
established a new rule permitting the imposition of an L WOP sentence based solely on
the nature of the offense, thereby violating the Eighth Amendment. The Court summarily
denied the petition for rehearing on June 21, 2011. 2 Appointed counsel did not seek
review in the United States Supreme Court. At the time the direct appeal was concluded,
the United States Supreme Court had not yet issued its decision in Miller v. Alabama, 567
U.S.

132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012).
Following the state court denial of rehearing, counsel sent Windom a

three-sentence letter alerting Windom of the denial of rehearing and advising him, "Our
office will no longer be representing you on this matter as this is the end of the state
appellate process." R. 139. The letter did not inform Ethan about his right to seek review
of his sentence in the United States Supreme Court, or about the availability of state and
federal collateral review. As to the prospect of getting any further relief on his fixed-life
sentence, the letter merely stated,

"Best wishes to you in the future."
R. 139.

2

State v. Windom, Docket No. 36656-2009, 2100 Ida. LEXIS 106 (2011).
2

Unrepresented, Windom did not seek state collateral review of his sentence.
By the time Miller was decided, the one year statute of limitations applicable to
post-conviction petitions in Idaho had passed, but the time for filing a federal habeas
corpus petition had not yet expired. Dennis Benjamin, an Idaho attorney interested in
juvenile L vVOP cases, sent Windom a letter advising him that there was still time to file a
petition in federal court. R. 246. Using the enclosed form petition provided by Mr.
Benjamin, Windom filed a federal petition on September 12, 2012. Windom remained
unrepresented until March 9, 2015, when counsel was appointed on appeal by the Ninth
Circuit following the federal court's summary dismissal of his federal petition. R. 241.
Appointed appellate counsel then filed the instant state petition on August 18, 2015, while
Windom's federal petition was pending. R. 5.
The state petition raised the following claims: 1) Ineffective Assistance of Trial
Counsel - After negotiating a plea to second degree murder without any agreement as to
sentencing, trial counsel failed to investigate and properly prepare for sentencing, and
failed to present relevant rebuttal and impeachment evidence and expert testimony that
was available at the time of sentencing; and 2) Ineffective Assistance of Appellate
Counsel - Appellate counsel failed to raise an Eighth Amendment argument on direct
appeal, failed to inform Windom of his right to raise an Eighth Amendment challenge to
his sentence, failed to properly raise this issue in the Opening Brief, and failed to advise

3

Windom of his rights to petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court and to
seek state post-conviction review and federal habeas corpus review of his sentence.
On August 26, 2015, the district court issued a conditional dismissal of the
petition. R. 148. Windom timely filed a response to the conditional dismissal and
requested discovery. R. 154. On September 14, 2015, the district court denied the
motion for discovery. R. 172.
Thereafter, the State filed an Answer and a motion for summary judgment. R. 178,
180, 188. After further briefing and argument on the motion for summary dismissal, on
January 26, 2016, Windom filed a motion to amend his petition to raise the Eighth
Amendment Montgomery 3 claim. R. 287, 351. After briefing and oral argument, the
district court denied the motion to amend and dismissed the petition on February 23,
2016. R. 360.
A timely notice of appeal was filed on March 15, 2016 and the district court
appointed counsel on appeal on April 1, 2016. R. 532.
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
I.

Did the district court err in refusing to permit Windom to amend his petition to add

an Eighth Amendment Claim based on the United States Supreme Court decision in
Montgomery v. Louisiana?

3Montgomery

v. Louisiana, 577 U.S._, 136 S.Ct. 718, 193 L.Ed.2d 599 (2016).
4

2.

Did the district court err in refusing to permit discovery of Windom's mental

health and Idaho Department of Corrections records to support his claim for equitable
tolling?
3.

Did the district court err in failing to provide funding for presentation of the

petit10n?
4.

Did the district court err in holding that Windom was not entitled to equitable

tolling thereby erroneously dismissing his petition as time barred?
5.

Does the petition state claims which are sufficient to warrant an evidentiary

hearing on the merits?
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT'S DENIAL OF WINDOM'S MOTION TO
ADD AN EIGHTH AMENDMENT CLAIM WAS ERROR

The district court erred in denying Windom's motion to amend his petition to add a
Montgomery claim, because Montgomery places substantive Eighth Amendment limits on

the sentencing court's imposition of a discretionary fixed-life sentence for juvenile
homicide offenders, is retroactive and therefore applicable to Windom's sentence and,
this claim could not have been reasonably known or raised earlier as the motion to amend
the petition was filed one day after Montgomery was decided by the United States
Supreme Court.
A.

Legal Standards

Post-conviction proceedings are civil in nature, and therefore are governed by the
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. A1cKinney v. State, 133 Idaho 695, 699-700, 992 P.2d
5

144, 148-49 (1999). Once a responsive pleading has been filed, a party may amend a
pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party. LR.C.P. 15(a).
Leave to amend may be denied due to "undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the
part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendment previously
allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment,
futility of amendment, etc." McCann v. McCann, 138 Idaho 228, 237, 61 P.3d 585
(2002), quoting Carl H Christensen Family Trust v. Christensen, 133 Idaho 866, 871,
993 P.2d 197 (1999). The decision to grant leave to amend a pleading is a matter that is
within the discretion of the trial court and is subject to reversal on appeal only if the court
abused its discretion. Black Canyon Racquetball Club, Inc. v. Idaho First Nat'! Bank,
NA., 119 Idaho 171, 175, 804 P.2d 900 (1991). Leave to amend "shall be freely given

when justice requires." I.R.C.P. I5(a); McCann, supra, 138 Idaho at 237; Smith v. Great
Basin Grain Co., 98 Idaho 266,272, 561 P.2d 1299 (1977).

On appeal, when reviewing for an abuse of discretion, the court examines: (I)
whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the
trial court acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the
legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3) whether the trial
court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. McCann, supra, 138 Idaho at 237;
Burgess v. Salmon River Canal Co., Ltd., 127 Idaho 565,573,903 P.2d 730 (1995).

6

C

The District Court Abused its Discretion in Denying
Windom's Motion for Leave to Amend the Petition to Add
the Eighth Amendment Claim
l.

The Proposed Amendment to the Petition Raised a Valid, Non-Futile
Claim

In 1963, Henry Montgomery, age 17, shot and killed a police officer and was
sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. After spending almost 50
years in prison, at age 69, Montgomery's life sentence was reversed by the United States
Supreme Court and his case remanded for resentencing. Montgomery v. Louisiana,
supra, at 136 S.Ct. at 725, 737. In so doing, the Supreme Court held not only that the
Eighth Amendment guarantee addressed in Miller v. Alabama, supra, 132 S.Ct. 245, was
a substantive constitutional right that is enforceable retroactively, it also made clear that
Miller "did more than require a sentencer to consider a juvenile offender's youth before
imposing life without parole; it established that the penological justifications for life
without parole collapse in light of the distinctive attributes of youth," Montgomery, supra,
136 S.Ct. at 734. Thus, the Court concluded that "sentencing a child to life without
parole is excessive for all but the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable
corruption," and "life without parole is an unconstitutional penalty for a class of
defendants because of their status-that is,juvenile offenders whose crimes reflect the
transient immaturity ofyouth. [Citation omitted]." Ibid. (italics added). 4 Consequently,

While the Court noted that Miller did not absolutely foreclose a sentencer' s ability
to impose life without parole on a juvenile, it barred life without parole for all but those
4

7

"[e]ven if a court considers a child's age before sentencing him or her to a lifetime in
that sentence still violates the Eighth Amendment for a child whose crime reflects
unfortunate yet transient immaturity." Ibid. (Internal quotation marks omitted; italics

added).
}vfontgomery applies }vfiller to all juvenile homicide offenders sentenced to life

without parole, even those sentenced under discretionary sentencing regimes. 5 It requires
that before imposing a fixed-life sentence, the sentencer must "take into account how
children are different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing
them to a lifetime in prison." lbid. 6 Because the sentencing court in this case did not

juvenile offenders "whose crimes reflect permanent incorrigibility." Id. at 734 (italics
added). Thus, "Miller is retroactive because it 'necessarily carr[ies] a significant risk that
a defendant'- here, the vast majority of juvenile offenders - 'faces a punishment that the
law cannot impose upon him.' [Citation omitted]" Ibid.
e.g., McKinley v. Butler, 809 F.3d 908 (7th Cir. 2016) [anticipating Miller's
retroactivity, the Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded for reconsideration the state
prisoner's discretionary 100-year sentence in light of Miller]; Blackwell v. California, 133
S.Ct. 837 (2013) [case involving a discretionary life sentences that was remanded to the
state court "for further consideration in light of Miller . ... "]; Mauricio v. California, 133
S.Ct. 524 (2012) [same]; Guillen v. California, 133 S.Ct. 69 (2012) [same]; Adams v.
Alabama, Dkt. 15-6289, 578 U.S._ (May 23, 2016) [the Court vacated the fixed life
sentence imposed after petitioner's initial death sentence was vacated following Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), and remanded for consideration in light of Montgomery.
The sentence was "a product of that pre-Miller era" and "[a]fter Miller, youth is the
dispositive consideration for 'all but the rarest of children."' 578 U.S. _ at 2-3 (J.
Sotomayor, concurring).] (Emphasis added.)
5See,

Moreover, under Montgomery, the mere mention of youth or the existence of
discretion cannot establish that the sentencer gave appropriate mitigating weight to the
characteristics and circumstances of a juvenile's youth. For this reason, even where the
record reflects a sentencer's view that the juvenile was irredeemable, the sentence must
6

8

have the benefit of Miller and Montgomery, and did not consider the "distinctive
attributes of youth" in determining whether Windom' s crime "reflect[ ed] permanent
incorrigibility," it follows therefore, that Windom's life-without-parole sentence violates
the Eighth Amendment.
This error was not remedied on direct appeal by the Idaho Supreme Court. ·while
dissenting Justice Warren Jones voiced Eighth Amendment concerns regarding Windom's
fixed life sentence, the Majority upheld Windom's sentence based solely on the nature of
the offense and without applying any special consideration to the fact that Windom was a
child when he committed his crime. State v. Windom, 150 Idaho 873, 880-881; see also
880, n.2, 253 P.3d 310 (2011); State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 484, 272 P.3d 417
(2012) ["In State v. Windom, this Court recently upheld the determinate life sentence of a
minor, based solely upon the nature and gravity of the offense."]
Windom presented his motion for leave to add a Montgomery claim to his petition
one day after the Montgomery decision. Thus, there was no undue delay, bad faith or
dilatory motive on his part, and there is no undue prejudice to the State as Mr. Windom
was already serving the fixed-life sentence imposed. Moreover, given the extent of the
Montgomery holding, it is clear that Windom sought to raise a valid claim that may entitle
him to relief.

be revisited because, prior to Miller, such a record does not demonstrate that the sentencer
addressed the presumptive lack of penological justification for sentencing young people
to life in prison. ~Montgomery, 136 S.Ct. at 734-735.
9

The district court concluded that "if amending his petition to include an Eighth
Amendment claims would not change the Court's analysis, such amendment would be
futile and should be denied." R. 378. The court then denied the amendment by finding
that Montgomery and Miller applied to mandatory fixed-life sentence only, and was
therefore inapplicable to Windom. R. 378. The court went on to conclude that even if
these cases applied to Windom's discretionary fixed life sentence, their holdings did not
change the tolling analysis of the court. R. 378. Finally, the court concluded that the
sentencing decision complied with Miller and Montgomery. R. 379-386. The court
abused its discretion and the summary dismissal of this claim must be reversed.
For the reasons explained above, the court was incorrect in concluding that Miller
and Montgomery do not apply.
Next, the court failed to consider the applicable rules related to the statute of
limitations and equitable tolling. Even if the applicable statute of limitations has expired,
Idaho courts will permit a petitioner to raise significant claims which could not have be
known before expiration of the limitations period. As the Idaho Supreme Court held in
Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247, 250-51, 220 P.3d 1066 (2009),

In Charboneau v. State, we considered the relationship of LC § 19-4902
and LC.§ 19-4908. 144 Idaho 900, 174 P.3d 870 (2007). In Charboneau,
this Court recognized that rigid application of LC. § 19-4902 would
preclude courts from considering "claims which simply are not known to
the defendant within the time limit, yet raise important due process issues."
Id. at 904, 174 P.3d at 874. According to this Court's decision in State v.
Rhoades,

10

[p ]rocedural due process issues are raised whenever a person
risks being deprived of life, liberty, or property interests
because of governmental action. The requirement is that there
must be some process to ensure that the individual is not
arbitrarily deprived of his rights in violation of the state or
federal constitutions. This requirement is met when the
defendant is provided with notice and an opportunity to be
heard.
120 Idaho 795, 806, 820 P.2d 665, 676 (1991). The Court then used the
three-part balancing test enunciated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Mathews
v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976), to
determine whether due process had been afforded, balancing ( 1) the interest
at stake; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of the interest and the
probable value of additional or substitute safeguards; and (3) the
government's interest. Rhoades, 120 Idaho at 806-07, 820 P.2d at 676-77.
In this case, there can be no dispute that the interest (the prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment) is of the utmost importance - compliance with the dictates of
the Eighth Amendment in sentencing a juvenile offender to a life without parole sentence.
Moreover, assuming arguendo, that the other claims in the petition were validly dismissed
as untimely, this claim must be considered as a separate claim and analyzed on its own,
rather than in conjunction with the Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance of counsel
claims addressed in the original petition.
In Gutierrez-Medina v. State, 157 Idaho 34, 333 P.3d 849 (Ct. App. 2014), the
Court of Appeal inferred that where a constitutional right is to be applied retroactively,
the court must permit equitable tolling. While the court did not reach the issue presented
in this case, of whether retroactive application of a new substantive rule would form the

11

basis for equitable tolling, it held that because the claim raised in Gutierrez-Medina 7 was
not a "watershed rule" to be retroactively applied, the court "need not decide whether the
retroactive application of a new rule of criminal procedure would warrant equitable
tolling in this instance because we agree with the district court that Padilla does not apply
retroactively." Gutierrez-lvfedina, supra, 157 Idaho at 37.
In contrast here, the United States Supreme Court has already held that the Eighth
Amendment requirement regarding juvenile fixed-life sentences, whether imposed under
a mandatory or discretionary scheme, is a rule that must be applied retroactively by the
state and federal courts.
Finally, the court was incorrect that Windom's sentence complied with the Eighth
Amendment. The record reveals that sentencing court gave no consideration or weight to
the "distinctive attributes of youth" or whether Windom was "irreparably corrupt" before
imposing sentence. See, Montgomery, supra, 734-35. Moreover, both the Court of
Appeal and the Supreme Court upheld Windom's sentence based on the nature of the
offense standing alone. For these reasons, the district court was legally wrong and abused
its discretion in summarily dismissing this claim. This Court should remand the claim to
the district court with directions to reverse Windom's sentence or hold an evidentiary

Gutierrez-Medina alleged ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to provide
advice on the immigration consequences of a guilty plea under Padilla v. Kentucky, 559
U.S. 356, 373-74, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 176 L Ed.2d 284 (2010).
7

12

hearing on whether the Eighth Amendment permits the imposition of a fixed-life
sentence.
2.

State Courts Must Give Effect to Montgomery and Miller
Even if State Law Procedurally Bars Windom' s Petition

As explained above, Montgomery made clear for the first time that not only is

Miller retroactive, but its holding applies to both discretionary and mandatory life
sentences. Because the Supreme Court did not issue this decision until January 25, 2016,
Windom's Montgomery claim could not possibly have been raised in 2012, and Idaho's
post-conviction procedural rules cannot operate to foreclose a Montgomery claim when
the Supreme Court has determined that Miller is now retroactive. As the Supreme Court
recognized, the vast majority of juvenile offenders face punishments that the "law cannot
impose" upon them, and there is a grave risk that many are being held in violation of the
Constitution. Montgmery, supra, at 734. To remedy this grave risk, the Court concluded
that a state may either resentence the juvenile, or provide a mechanism whereby a juvenile
homicide offender may be considered for parole:
In light of what this Court has said in Roper, Graham, and Miller about
how children are constitutionally different from adults in their level of
culpability, ... , prisoners like Montgomery must be given the opportunity
to show their crime did not reflect irreparable corruption; and, if it did not,
their hope for some years of life outside prison walls must be restored.

Ibid.
The State's interest in the finality of Windom's sentence cannot be the sole basis
for denying Windom the opportunity to remedy a Eighth Amendment violation in light of
13

the Supreme Court holding giving retroactive application Montgomery. Even if
Windom's Sixth Amendment claims are time-barred, since Idaho's sentencing schemes
do not provide for any other avenue 8 to be heard on the question of a substantive
constitutional violation that has been held to be retroactive, this post-conviction action
must be allowed to proceed on this claim. Because Windom has no other means available
to him to remedy this violation, the district court failed to apply the proper legal standards
to Windom's motion to amend his petition, and thus abused its discretion in denying leave
to amend. See, Burgess, supra, 127 Idaho at 573.
The fundamental purpose of Idaho Code section 19-4901 is to remedy
constitutional violations that might otherwise go uncorrected. See, Aragon v. State, 114
Idaho 758, 766 n.12, 760 P.2d 1174 (1988) [ineffective assistance of counsel is not barred
by res judicata in post-conviction proceedings]. For this reason, the Supreme Court has
noted that "post-conviction relief is not barred ... where later case law suggests a
conviction is unlawful." Ibid. Accordingly, the Montogmery claim should be remanded

For example, the Idaho Commission of Pardons and Parole does not have
jurisdiction to grant parole to a person who has been sentenced to only a determinate
sentence, see LC. § 20-212, et. seq., thus, the mere commutation of Windom's sentence to
one of determinate life will not result in a parole hearing. Moreover, Windom cannot
raise his constitutional challenge in a rule 35 motion. See, LC. R. 35; State v. McKinney,
153 Idaho 837,291 P.3d 1036 (2013) [illegal sentence must appear on the face of the
judgment to be corrected under rule 35]. Accordingly, the district court's order results in
a ruling that forever bars Windom the opportunity to challenge his fixed-life sentence as
one imposed in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Thus, the district court order directly
contravenes the holding in Montgomery.
8

14

to the district court with directions to reverse Windom's sentence or hold an evidentiary
hearing on whether he meets the constitutional criteria for imposition of a fixed-life
sentence.
II.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DENYING WINDOM'S
REQUEST TO CONDUCT DISCOVERY
A.

Standard of Review
The denial of discovery in a post-conviction petition is reviewed on an abuse of

discretion standard. "To determine whether there is an abuse of discretion this Court
considers whether (1) the court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) the
court acted within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with legal standards
applicable to specific choices; and (3) the court reached its decision by an exercise of
reason." Hall v. State, 151 Idaho 42, 45,253 P.3d 716 (2011).
B.

The District Court Should Have Granted Discovery

Windom moved for very specific discovery related to evidence to prove his claim
that the Court should find that he was entitled to equitable tolling. Without opposition
from the State, the district court, without oral argument, denied the motion finding that
Windom was "engaging in a fishing expedition." R. 176. Given the circumstances of this
case, the denial of the narrowly tailored request for the issuance of two subpoenas to
facilities where Windom had been housed was an abuse of discretion.
Windom has always conceded that unless the court concluded that he was entitled
to equitabie toliing, his petition would be deemed untimely. Through pro bono counsel,
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Windom submitted that his on-going mental illness, his young age at the time of
sentencing, and his unique housing conditions due to his age were sufficient bases for the
court to find equitable tolling in his case. Counsel had been unable to obtain additional
evidence regarding the conditions of his confinement due to his youth and the state of his
mental illness after his sentencing because the Ada County jail and the Idaho Department
of Correction would not provide sufficient information without a subpoena, which can be
obtained only with the permission of the court in a post-conviction petition. See, I.C.R.,
Rule 57 (b ). As a result of this rule, counsel requested the issuance of the subpoenas to
the jail and department of correction. R. 164.
The district court in denying the subpoena request noted that the "bar" for a
petitioner to prove equitable tolling is high. R. 174. Yet, by failing to order issuance of
the two subpoenas, the district court prevented Windom from being able to meet the
standard for tolling and denied him a substantial right.
A district court has discretion to grant discovery in post-conviction
proceedings. I.C.R. 57(b); Hall v. State, 151 Idaho 42, 45,253 P.3d 716,
719 (2011 ). However, discovery is required when a petitioner demonstrates
it is necessary to protect his substantial rights. Hall, 151 Idaho at 45, 253
P.3d at 719. The petitioner "must identify the specific subject matter where
discovery is requested and why discovery as to those matters is necessary to
his or her application." Id. (quoting State v. LePage, 138 Idaho 803, 810, 69
P.3d 1064, 1071 (Ct. App. 2003)). While reasonable discovery may be
permitted, the district court should not allow the petitioner to engage in a
"[f]ishing expedition." Murphy v. State, 143 Idaho 139, 148, 139 P.3d 741,
750 (Ct. App. 2006). "The UPCPA provides a forum for known grievances,
not an opportunity to research for grievances." Id.
State v. Abdullah, 158 Idaho 386,482,348 P.3d 1 (2015)
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Contrary to the district court's opinion, the discovery request was specific and
narrowly drawn to provide the court with support for the assertion that Windom was
entitled to equitable tolling. This request is distinguishable from the one in Raudebaugh
v. State, 135 Idaho 602, 21 P.3d 924 (200 I) where the petitioner sought to retest scientific
evidence in hopes that some claim might develop. "[A] post-conviction action is not a
vehicle for unrestrained testing or retesting of physical evidence introduced at the
criminal trial. In Raudebaugh, our Supreme Court concluded that the trial court had
discretion to deny discovery in a post-conviction action where the applicant did not show
any probability that further scientific examination or independent testing would yield
exculpatory evidence." Murphy v. State, 143 Idaho 139, 148, 139 P.3d 741 (Ct. App.
2006).
In contrast, here, there was extensive evidence presented about Windom's mental
status at the time of the underlying criminal case; counsel requested the subpoenas to
demonstrate that Windom's mental state continued to be an issue during his incarceration
and was therefore a basis for a finding that the statute of limitations should be tolled. The
petition and the exhibits attached thereto, plus the declaration of counsel, sufficiently
narrowed the focus of the subpoena request such that the district court abused its
discretion in denying the discovery. Relying on the absence of sufficient evidence to
support his claim of equitable tolling, the district court dismissed the petition as time
barred. R. 371-372. By first denying Windom permission to obtain the discovery and
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funds needed to present his claims, and then blaming Windom for not presenting the very
evidence that he needed to court's permission to obtain, the district court abused its
discretion and denied Windom due process.
Therefore, this Court should reverse the order denying discovery and remand to the
district court with directions to order the subpoenas and thereafter reconsider the question
of whether equitable tolling is warranted in Petitioner's case.

III.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DENYING WINDOM'S
REQUEST FOR EXPENSES
After obtaining some of Windom' s medical records from the prison, counsel

moved the district court for appointment of experts to assist in interpreting the
medications and medical records to support the claim that Windom was entitled to
equitable tolling. R 252. The State did not file a written response to this motion. The
district court denied this motion and simultaneously dismissed the petition as barred by
the statute of limitations. R. 259, 273.
A motion for appointment of experts in a post-conviction petition is reviewed
under an abuse of discretion standard. Murphy v. State, supra, 143 Idaho at 148.
"If the applicant is unable to pay court costs and expenses of representation,

including stenographic, printing, witness fees and expenses, and legal services, these
costs and expenses, and a court-appointed attorney may be made available to the applicant
in the preparation of the application, in the trial court, and on appeal. ... " LC. § 19-4904.
In Afurphy, the appeilate court set aside the district court's summary dismissal of an
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ineffective assistance claim where the district court had denied expert funds for the
petitioner. Finding that an expert was needed to prove the prejudice prong of the claim,
the appellate court held that "the LC. § 19-4904 motion for funding to retain an expert
witness should have been granted in order to protect Murphy's substantial right to
effective assistance of counsel. The district court erred in summarily dismissing this claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel without first granting Murphy the opportunity to
consult with a forensic pathologist." Murphy v. State, supra, 143 Idaho at 149.
The district court abused its discretion by denying funds to have an expert review
the medical records and then determining that there was no genuine issue of material fact
regarding Windom's mental capacity regarding the tolling issue. R. 273, 371-372.
Because the district court prevented Windom from presenting the totality of the facts
relevant to the issue of equitable tolling, the denial of the funds interfered with Windom's
substantial rights to have the facts regarding equitable tolling presented to the district
court. As in Murphy, this Court should set aside the summary dismissal of the petition
and remand with directions to authorize the retention of experts for the purpose of
supporting Windom' s assertion that equitable tolling requires consideration of the merits
of the petition.
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IV.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT
EQUITABLE TOLLING WAS INAPPLICABLE IN THIS CASE
"Review of the district court's construction and application of the limitation statute

is a matter of free review." Freeman v. State, 122 Idaho 627, 628, 836 P.2d 1088 (Ct.
App. 1992). Thus, this Court's consideration of the law of equitable tolling regarding the
statute of limitations is also controlled by "free review."
"The statute of limitation may be equitably tolled, however. Equitable tolling for
post-conviction actions is 'borne of the petitioner's due process right to have a
meaningful opportunity to present his or her claims."' Schultz v. State, 151 Idaho 383,
385-86, 256 P.3d 791 (Ct. App. 2011) [10] (quoting Leer v. State, 148 Idaho 112, 115,
218 P.3d 1173 (Ct. App. 2009)).
A petitioner's due process right is not violated by a statute of limitations bar unless
he can show that he was incapable of filing a timely petition and, therefore, imposing the
statute of limitations bar would deny him any meaningful opportunity to present his
post-conviction claims. Amboh v. State, 149 Idaho 650, 653, 239 P.3d 448 (Ct. App.
2010)
"Equitable tolling has only been recognized in Idaho where the petitioner was
incarcerated in an out-of-state facility without legal representation or access to Idaho legal
materials and where mental disease and/or psychotropic medication prevented the
petitioner from timely pursuing challenges to the conviction." Rhoades, 148 Idaho at
251; Schultz, 151 Idaho at 3 86; Leer, 148 Idaho at 115. Our Supreme Court has stated,
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however, that at least where the post-conviction claim raises important due process issues,
the limitation period may be postponed until the petitioner has discovered the factual
basis for the claim. Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 904, 174 P.3d 870, 874 (2007)."

Gutierrez-Medina v. State, supra, 157 Idaho at 36-37.
This case is similar to Abbott v. State, 129 Idaho 381, 924 P.2d 1225 (Ct. App.
1996), where the appellate court found that there were material issues of fact regarding
the petitioner's mental capability in relation to the doctrine of equitable tolling and held
that summary dismissal on that ground was not proper. "Abbott's assertion that mental
disease or psychotropic medication rendered him incompetent and prevented him from
earlier pursuing challenges to his conviction are sufficient to raise factual issues and
intertwining legal issues as to whether he was prevented from timely filing his action by
mental incapacity or medication, whether strict application of the one-year statute of
limitation would deprive Abbott of any meaningful opportunity to present his claims for
post-conviction relief, and whether the statute of limitation should be deemed tolled in
such circumstance to avoid violation of constitutional due process guarantees." Id. at
385.
While the district court distinguished Windom's non-capital case from equitable
tolling rules in capital cases, R. 174, that is not the law in Idaho. While different statutes
of limitations may apply depending on the nature of the case, the concepts related to
equitable tolling remain the same.
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While LC. § 19-4908 does not mention whether successive petitions must
be filed within the one year time limitation, the statute clearly contemplates
there may be circumstances under which a successive petition may be filed
if the trial court finds a claim "for sufficient reason was not asserted or was
inadequately raised" in the original petition. Moreover, as acknowledged by
the State, there may be claims which simply are not known to the defendant
within the time limit, yet raise important due process issues. In Stuart v.
State, 118 Idaho 932, 934, 801 P.2d 1283 (1990), this Court considered a
successive petition containing allegations that the sheriffs office had been
tape recording confidential attorney-client conversations within the jail. The
information had come to light only "recently" but several years after the
original petition for post-conviction relief. Nevertheless, this Court
considered the successive petition. For that reason, we agree with the
district court that there should be a reasonable time within which such
claims are asserted in a successive post-conviction petition, once those
claims are known. The trial court's analysis of "sufficient reason"
permitting the filing of a successive petition must necessarily include an
analysis of whether the claims being made were asserted within a
reasonable period of time. In determining what a reasonable time is for
filing a successive petition, we will simply consider it on a case-by-case
basis, as has been done in capital cases.

Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 904-05, 174 P.3d 870 (2007) (emphasis added.).
The district court erred by failing to consider the fact that Windom was completely
unrepresented from the affirmance of his sentence in 2011 until 2015 when the Ninth
Circuit appointed counsel. The mentally ill Windom was left without counsel for this
four year period and during this period of time the statute of limitations should have been
tolled. Less than six months after Windom was appointed counsel, he filed the instant
petition asserting claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel.
Windom has made a prima facie showing that the limitation period should be
equitably tolled in accordance with State v. Dunlap, 131 Idaho 57 6, 961 P .2d 1179
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(1998). In Dunlap, the defendant failed to comply with the 42-day deadline ofldaho
Code section 19-2719 by filing his petition almost two years after the expiration of the
time limit. Dunlap alleged in his petition the ineffective assistance of counsel with
respect to his plea, sentencing, appeal and lack of post-conviction proceedings. Dunlap's
former counsel's files contained no correspondence with Duniap about his right to apply
for post-conviction relief. The district court dismissed Dunlap's petition as untimely.
The Idaho Supreme Court reversed the district court, finding that because of former
counsel's omissions, the statute oflimitations was tolled, and since the petition had been
filed within forty-two days after the appointment of Dunlap's current counsel, the petition
was timely.
Here, similar to Dunlap, because of appellate and trial counsel's omissions,
Windom was not aware that he could challenge his sentence through a state postconviction action. There is no evidence that either trial or appellate counsel advised him
of his right to post-conviction relief. On the contrary, appellate counsel's final letter
merely informed Windom of the loss of his appeal and wished him "good luck" with the
future. Following the withdrawal of appellate counsel, Windom remained unrepresented
until he was appointed counsel in the appeal of the denial of his federal post-conviction
petition. And, like Dunlap, Windom filed his petition for post-conviction relief within
the time period permitted after the appointment of current counsel. Cf., Martinez v. State,
130 Idaho 530, 944 P.2d 127 (Ct. App. 1997) ["Although he has asserted facts which, if
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true, amounted to a deprivation of his right of access to the Idaho courts, and this
deprivation may have temporarily tolled the statute of limitation, such tolling ceased
when Martinez retained an Idaho attorney. He did not thereafter file his post-conviction
application within the one-year limitation period."]
'
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Court. In Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S.Ct. 1309, 182 L.Ed.2d 272 (2012), the Supreme Court
held that where there is an absence of counsel, or ineffective counsel, in a state's initialreview collateral proceeding, a procedural rule barring review of an ineffective assistance
of counsel claim may result in a due process violation. The Court reasoned that where the
initial-review collateral proceeding is the first designated proceeding for a prisoner to
raise a claim of ineffective assistance at trial, it is the equivalent of a prisoner's direct
appeal as to the ineffective-assistance claim. Thus, the Court concluded that when the
state habeas court looks to the merits of the claim of ineffective assistance, no other court
has addressed the claim, and under these circumstances, prisoners are "generally ill
equipped" to represent themselves.
[A]n attorney's errors during an appeal on direct review may provide cause
to excuse a procedural default; for if the attorney appointed by the State to
pursue the direct appeal is ineffective, the prisoner has been denied fair
process and the opportunity to comply with the State's procedures and
obtain an adjudication on the merits of his claims. [Citations.]
Martinez, at 1317 [citations omitted].

Without the help of an adequate attorney, a prisoner will have similar
difficulties vindicating a substantial ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel
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claim. Claims of ineffective assistance at trial often require investigative
work and an understanding of trial strategy. When the issue cannot be
raised on direct review, moreover, a prisoner asserting an
ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim in an initial-review collateral
proceeding cannot rely on a court opinion or the prior work of an attorney
addressing that claim. Halbert, 545 U.S., at 619, 125 S.Ct. 2582, 162
L.Ed.2d 552. To present a claim of ineffective assistance at trial in
accordance with the State's procedures, then, a prisoner likely needs an
effective attorney. The same would be true if the State did not appoint an
attorney to assist the prisoner in the initial-review collateral proceeding.
The prisoner, unlearned in the law, may not comply with the State's
procedural rules or may misapprehend the substantive details of federal
constitutional law. Cf., e.g., id., at 620-621, 125 S.Ct. 2582, 162 L.Ed 2d
552 (describing the educational background of the prison population).
While confined to prison, the prisoner is in no position to develop the
evidentiary basis for a claim of ineffective assistance, which often turns on
evidence outside the trial record.
A prisoner's inability to present a claim of trial error is of particular
concern when the claim is one of ineffective assistance of counsel. The
right to the effective assistance of counsel at trial is a bedrock principle in
our justice system. It is deemed as an "obvious truth" the idea that "any
person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured
a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him." Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335, 344, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963).
Martinez, at 1317-1318 [emphasis added.]

Windom is the "ill-equipped" prisoner Martinez recognized. This is particularly so
given the unique circumstances of his case, including his youthful age, mental illness,
conditions of incarceration and his ineffective appellate counsel. Following the State
Appellate Defender's summary termination of its representation, Windom was left
without notice of his post-conviction rights, or the statue of limitations requirements.
Moreover, he had no indication from appellate counsel that his trial counsel had been
ineffective. Given Windom's particular circumstances, and the abandonment by appellate
25

counsel, Windom had no ability to preserve his claims of ineffective assistance of trial
counsel. Indeed, the only reason Windom was able to file a federal writ of habeas corpus
was due to the serendipitous intervention of good Samaritan counsel who wrote to
Windom, encouraged him to file the federal writ, and enclosed a form enabling Windom
to use for this purpose.
Thus, this Court should adopt the principles set forth by the United States Supreme
Court and hold that based on these particular facts and circumstances, Windom' s petition
was timely filed.

V.

REMAND IS REQUIRED PERMIT THE DISTRICT COURT TO
CONSIDER THE MERITS OF THE INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE
OF COUNSEL CLAIMS
While the district court did not consider the merits of the ineffective assistance

claims at sentencing or on appeal, the petition states sufficient facts to warrant
consideration of the merits of the claims in the first instance by the district court.
Allegations in an application for post-conviction relief must be deemed to be true
until controverted by the state. King v. State, 114 Idaho 442, 757 P.2d 705 (Ct. App.
1988). A material fact is one which if true would entitle the petitioner to relief. See e.g.,

Noelv. State, 113 Idaho 92,741 P.2d 728 (Ct. App. 1987).
In determining whether a motion for summary disposition is properly
granted, a court must review the facts in a light most favorable to the
petitioner, and determine whether they would entitle petitioner to relief if
accepted as true. Ivey, 123 Idaho at 80, 844 P.2d at 709; Parrott v. State,
117 Idaho 272,274, 787 P.2d 258,260 (1990). A court is required to accept
the petitioner's unrebutted allegations as true, but need not accept the
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petitioner's conclusions. Ivey, supra; Kraft v. State, 100 Idaho 671, 674, 603
P .2d 1005, 1008 (1979). The standard to be applied to a trial court's
determination that no material issue of fact exists is the same type of
determination as in a summary judgment proceeding. Ivey, supra; State v.
Christensen, 102 Idaho at 489, 632 P.2d at 678.

Saykhamchone v. State, 127 Idaho 319,321,900 P.2d 795 (1995).
"Summary dismissal is permissible only when the petitioner's evidence has raised
no genuine issue of material fact that, if resolved in the petitioner's favor, would entitle
the petitioner to the requested relief. If such a factual issue is presented, an evidentiary
hearing must be conducted. Gonzales v. State, 120 Idaho 759, 763, 819 P.2d 1159 (Ct.
App. 1991)." State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 561, 199 P.3d 123 (2008).
While the post-conviction court was the also the sentencing court which sentenced
Windom to fixed-life, the issue before the post-conviction court is not whether the
sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence in light of the new evidence.
Rather, the issue is whether trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel when
it failed to investigate sentencing witnesses and failed to present evidence that was
available to counsel at the time of sentencing.
To prevail on this claim, Windom must demonstrate that trial counsels'
performance was deficient and that it was prejudicial. This is an objective standard.
Thus, the determination is not whether a particular sentencing judge would have been
swayed by the new evidence, but whether there is a reasonable probability of a different
result. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 537 (2003) [Strickland standard is a "reasonable
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probability" that an objective sentencing fact finder would have struck a difference
balance."]; Summerlin v. Schriro, 427 F.3d 623, 643 (9th Cir, 2005), citing Rompilla v.

Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 393 (2005) ["Although we suppose that the [sentencer] could have
heard it all and still have decided on the [same] penalty, that is not the test."].
In this case, the allegations in the petition are sufficient to warrant an evidentiary
hearing on the ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel claims. Therefore,
remand is necessary should this Court conclude that the petition was timely filed.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the orders dismissing the
petition and denying the motion to amend the petition and thereafter remand the case to
the district court to either hold an evidentiary hearing or to re-sentence Windom.

Dated: September 12, 2016.
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Attorneys for Petitioner/Appellant
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